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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

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APR 2 1981

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: P - Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

FROM: PM - Richard Burt

SUBJECT: Military Options for Polish Crisis

Attached is the Pentagon's response to our request, which you authorized, for something comparable to EUR's spread sheet, on political and economic steps we would consider in the early days of a Polish crisis. The attached paper, as you see, is of some utility, but much less detailed than State's spread sheet. We understand the JCS are working on something a bit more ambitious, but they cannot now promise us that it will be completed, or made available.

In addition to this work on short term measures, we are in the process of preparing an IG report on possible longer term military and political-military responses to Soviet intervention which will be available in a few days.

Attachment:

As stated.

Drafted: PM:JFDobbins:dlf
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State Dept. review completed

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	Situation Imposition of Martial Law in Poland/Continuing Civil Strife/No Sign of Imminent Soviet Move.	Situation Intelligence Community Determines Strong Likelihood that Intervention is Imminent.	Situation Clear-Cut Soviet Intervention Occurs.
USG	Consider increasing surveillance capability - Increase flights of in-theater recon assets (1-SR-71, 1-RC-135, 1-U-2) - Deploy additional assets (SR-71, RC-135, U-2, C-130, RU-21) - Deploy two additional E-3As/AWACS (upon SACEUR request)	1. Review options previously considered 2. Consider increasing command/control/communications capability - Prepare for use of host nation communications and improve redundancy of key systems - Provide contingency assets for communications augmentation to USEUCOM HQ 3. Consider increasing readiness of dual-based forces in CONUS - CRESTED CAP (48 F-4Es) - Dual-based reconnaissance (54 RF-4Cs) - REFORGER (2 brigades of 1st Inf Div only) 4. Improve logistics readiness in Europe - Increase shipments of munitions, equipment and aircraft spares to correct shortages	1. Review options previously considered 2. Consider filling key personnal shortages in Europe (11,000 personnal) 3. Consider deploying 54 dual-based RF-4Cs to Europe to increase reconnaissance capability (closure: 48 hours) 4. Consider deploying forces under existing exercise scenarios: - CRESTED CAP: 48 dual-based F-4Es to Europe (closure: 48 hours) - ELIGIBLE RECEIVER: 1 Army Brigade for no-notice POMCUS exercise in FRG (closure: 10 days) - REFORGER (-): 1st Inf Div (-) to FRG (closure: 9 days) 5. Consider deploying other forces to Europe as required - Additional maritime patrol aircraft - USMC Marine Amphibious Brigade (closure: 15 days) - Second carrier battle group (closure: 13-17 days) - Forward station 6th Cavalry Brigade Air Combat in FRG
NATO	Consider increasing surveillance/intelligence capability - Implement military vigilance measure: intensify intelligence collecting and reporting (authority pre-delegated to SACEUR) - Increase flights of 2 E-3As/AWACS currently under SACEUR operation control	1. Review options previously considered 2. Consider increasing command/control/communications readiness by implementing military vigilance measures (authority pre-delegated to SACEUR) - Man war HQ with skeleton staffs - Man war communications centers - Implement communications security - Open and test communications nets 3. Consider increasing force readiness - Implement military vigilance measure: check plans and prepare to implement alert measures (authority pre-delegated to SACEUR) - Double number of air defense aircraft and surface-to-air missiles on alert - Alert STANAVFORLANT (6 destroyers) for deployment to Skagerrak - Alert Allied Command Europe Mobile Force-Air (18 US, 100 Allied fighters) for deployment to Norther	1. Review options previously considered 2. Consider increasing force readiness by implementing additional military vigilance measures - Improve availability/readiness of forces - Prepare for deployment of forces (correct malpositioning, forward stage covering/screening forces) - Prepare to disperse air forces - Prepare to implement logistic support for forces 3. Consider deploying NATO-command forces - STANAVFORLANT to conduct exercises or surveillance - Allied Command Mobile Force-Air to Northern REgion for exercises - Activate Naval-on-call-force Med (4-6 destroyer or larger force) and deploy in Med for exercises

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Possible Political Measures

Since December 23, 1980 discussions in the Alliance, in smaller groups, and bilaterally have drawn on the list circulated by the NATO International Staff and which NATO PermReps agreed should form the essential elements for a menu to be studied further in capitals and then decided by Foreign Ministers at an emergency Ministerial following soon after any intervention. Wording of and the numbering of measures below follows the form in that NATO document.

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1. Make protest demarches where and as appropriate.

2. Call for emergency UN Security Council Meeting and, if appropriate, a meeting of the General Assembly.

   This measure has been discussed among Allied UN PermReps in New York.

3. Conduct intensive campaign of public condemnation

4. Recall Ambassadors from Moscow and, perhaps other Warsaw Pact capitals for consultations.

From Other Warsaw Pact Capitals

A) As with other measures involving the other Eastern Europeans, including the GDR, whether and how to act will depend upon the actual nature of the governments' participation. (It is understood that the FRG has special interests where the GDR is concerned.)

From Warsaw

A) If the Soviets put in a puppet government then Ambassadors should probably be recalled for consultations.

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5. Suspend participation in the CSCE Madrid meeting following condemnation of Soviet actions on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act.

6. Suspend participation in arms control and disarmament negotiations such as MBFR, CTB, CD, CDE.

7. Review with the United States SALT and LRTNF negotiations.

8. Impose additional restrictions on Soviet, and possibly other Warsaw Pact Embassies, including limits on travel and staff at all levels.

9. Suspend all exchanges of high-level visits with Warsaw Pact States participating in the intervention.

10. Suspend major cultural, academic, scientific and athletic exchanges and, if applicable, the execution of cultural agreements.

11. Urge like-minded and other countries to emulate Allied measures.

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Possible Economic Measures

1. All exports from our countries to the Soviet Union not covered by existing contracts are embargoed. It was agreed on 2/9/81 that broad framework agreements should not be considered existing contracts where this measure is concerned.

2. No new official credits, credit guarantees, or credit insurance shall be issued in support of trade with the Soviet Union. We further recommend that private banks exercise strong restraint in providing new financial facilities, loans and credits to the USSR.

3. We will curtail, to the extent possible under existing agreements, air, land, and sea transport services with the USSR, and Soviet fishery in waters under our jurisdiction.

4. We call upon our companies to take note of the new political situation and to exercise restraint in their commercial dealings with the Soviet Union, and we ask them to establish no new commercial representation in the Soviet Union. N.B. Agreed on 2/9/81 to delete announcement of this measure as superfluous but to work at NATO to encourage fifty percent reduction of Soviet non-diplomatic commercial representation in our countries.

5. We will examine, jointly and urgently, possibilities for further restraints particularly on the transfer of advanced technology. N.B. Decided on 2/9/81 to commit to do the work at COCOM but not to announce it as a measure since lengthy time required to implement might be misunderstood.

6. In addition, economic advisors shall continue to examine all the possibilities suggested in the British list and those raised in their previous discussions.

7. The question of whether to apply similar measures against other members of the Warsaw Pact will be considered in the light of their actual participation. (Regarding the GDR, The FRG and the three Allied powers will examine the implications for Berlin of Polish developments on the basis of their special responsibilities.) How Poland itself will be treated would depend, inter alia, on whether the Polish Government invited in and cooperated with Soviet military activities.

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8. While not a post-intervention measure, the important question of immediate economic assistance for Poland, including debt relief, is also on the agenda as it relates to chances for deterring an intervention.

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